BRIEF

Russian Kodori Checkpoint

The Russian PKF commander in the Kodori that UNMO Payton is speaking to can be heard talking about the difficulty evacuating checkpoint 107, which is up the road leading to the Svan Valley. Apparently, when the road washed out, checkpoint 107 was isolated and unable to be supported or resupplied by ground in case of attack or even an accident (The nearest helicopter support being at the Russian PKF HQ in Sokhumi). To evacuate, Russian soldiers loaded their truck, tied it to a BTR, and drove into the Kalasuri River, using the BTR as a drag-anchor. The truck, tethered to the much heavier BTR creeping along behind them, was able to withstand the river’s current and redeploy to the company headquarters, albeit slowly.

The long view—a Russian Peacekeeping Force (PKF) has been a permanent fixture along Georgian Abkhaz fault lines since late spring 1994. It was first proposed in September 1993 when Abkhaz forces violated a newly minted cease-fire agreement. The Supreme Soviet issued statements accusing the Georgian government of resorting to violence to resolve the situation, and proposed a Russian peacekeeping force—ostensibly to protect infrastructure and civilian populations—be deployed to Georgia.  Additionally, there were reports and accusations of direct Russian military aid to Abkhaz separatists during the military stages of the conflict.

The initial 3,000 strong Russian PKF contingent, deployed on both sides of the Inguri River, was initially scheduled to be replaced by a second wave of CIS troops, but the CIS force never materialized.  Russian PKF continues to operate on a six months mandate that is constantly renewed--much to the angst of the Georgian government, which continues to request that all Russian units leave Georgian territory.

On a purely operational basis, although the relationship has not always been symbiotic, Russian PKF units have facilitated United Nations observers’ work in the Gali sector along the violence-ridden Inguri River and also the tense Kodori Corridor. Unarmed, UNMOs have relied heavily, at times, on the support of PKF forces, to fulfill their mandate. During periods of tension UNOMIG and PKF personnel have patrolled the Kodori jointly. PKF units have not been left unscathed and suffered their share of casualties, WIA and KIA.

Consequently, it is still believed by many Georgians, and outside analysts, that current PKF forces continue to support Russian state policy. This isn’t unlikely considering all armies are, in theory, instruments of the state to which they belong. The real questions are; why they are in Abkhazia in the first place, which is more a manifestation of Russia’s power in its sphere of influence, and finally, what is Russian policy towards Abkhazia? If Moscow wanted Abkhazia to be truly independent of Georgia, or a part of the Russian Federation, they could have made it so. In reality, the status quo is good for Russia as a conflict unresolved extends the peacekeeping mandate and its forward line of troops in a region in which it is struggling to maintain its power.