The conflict in Georgia continues to stay interesting. Besides the presence of US naval ships off the southern most port city of Batumi, and Russian units solidifying positions in the port city of Poti, a Georgian train carrying oil blew up and caught on fire yesterday. First reports indicate a landmine and Georgia blames Russia.

But what about the train’s cargo–oil. The biggest pipeline in the region, the Baku Tbilisi Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline was actually closed on August 6th due to an explosion to the pipeline in Turkey. It remains closed and Baku is rightfully concerned. Baku is booming thanks in large part due to revenue from petroleum and the BTC represents about 80% of the oil and and natural gas exports for Azerbaijan (There are two additional pipelines). That amount represents about $70 million a day. So far, that represents a loss of about $500 million in revenue.

Georgia and Turkey also forfeit transit fees that they would otherwise collect from oil and natural gas passing through their territory. Which brings us to the oil train explosion in Georgia yesterday. There are a lot of immediate concerns about Caspian oil and natural gas traversing its long routes through Georgia and Turkey to world markets.

We made a film about just that a couple of years ago. I don’t really like to tout our work so overtly here in blog but the basic story line of the film is currently being realized.

Hey Grayden–missile man. Did you see this image. Any idea of what missile this is?

It made me think about similar reports from the war in Chechnya. So I went back through my notes from previous interviews and I was surprised at how much the Chechens talk about missile strikes against them. Honestly I never really thought about it to much and probably discounted the probability of such attacks. Hmmm.

I think I got lost in the concept of the missiles being wildly inaccurate, recalling the missile exchanges in the Iraq-Iran War. I thought of rockets as an area saturation weapon, and then questioning Russian use based on the premise that it was to risky considering their own troops were often in the vicinity of the strikes. It probably doesn’t help that many of the Chechens refer to all rocket attacks as SCUDs, reinforcing my issues with accuracy. I guess I better learn a bit more about these weapons.

In the continuing saga of Russia’s ballistic diplomacy, the New York Times is reporting that Russia has moved several SS-21 missile launchers into South Ossetia, citing “American officials familiar with intelligence reports.” That puts most of Georgia, including Tbilisi, in ballistic missile range. And that feels a lot like a stranglehold.

On the ground in Georgia, the same article cites conflicting reports about Russian troop movements. Tanks were seen moving north through the Roki Tunnel, but also south toward Tbilisi. That would mean Russia continues to ignore both the peace agreement brokered by French president Nicolas Sarkozy and the Bush Administration’s (admittedly gentle) demands for a pull-out.

Russia looks like the only player in this game with any teeth. If I’m a former Soviet Republic or satellite considering NATO membership, that doesn’t exactly make me a motivated buyer. I’m not saying the US or NATO should respond with force, but an active Russian military could force NATO to reconsider its expansionist drive into Russia’s cold war sphere of influence.

Grayden, you may be right about Russian ballistic missiles. I saw an image of what they say are the remains of a missile in Gori. I’ll need to go back and grab the url.

Also the Abkhazians now hold control of the Inguri Dam and all the territory in the Gali Sector up to the Inguri River. I think I posted a blog about that early on, I figured the Abkhazians would move into the sector immediately to deny any Georgian efforts to grab back the Gali sector to the Gali Canal.

Although it is supposed to be occupied by UNOMIG and the Russian PKF, it isn’t the first time the Abkhazian military units have been in the Gali sector, Georgians too for that matter, periodically since the 1994 ceasefire both Abkhazians, and Georgian paramilitaries, have occupied portions of the fertile river valley. On a couple of occasions ending in substantial skirmishes and IDPs (Internally Displaced People).

And I am still impressed with the Russian Army’s performance in Georgia.

In case you missed it, Dodge had an interesting piece at NationalReview.com yesterday, reviewing the role of ethnic conflicts and post-Cold War history in the fight for South Ossetia. Here’s a taste.

“Analysts have not paid enough attention to the Ossetian voice in the conflict between Russia and Georgia. The truth is, both the Ossetians and Abkhazians are happy to side with Moscow. Why? Because ethnic conflicts are nasty, and long before the latest upheaval, enough civilian blood had been spilled to harden resolve for decades if not forever. Georgia’s military has contributed to the problem.”

Read on: Politics is Local.

I just received an email from a Georgian reservist who was initially mobilized but never ended up even picking up his gun as by the time he reported (Saturday) the Georgian army was being routed.

Anyway, he says that Tbilisi is relatively calm now, the initial panic seems to have subsided. Most businesses are closed still but people are starting to go about their business–while anticipating a Russian withdrawal out of Gori and the opening of the main east-west road across the country.

The power is also back on in Batumi.

More later.

Well, I was wrong in an earlier post suggesting that Russian troops would not likely reach into Georgia proper. The Russians did seize the major population center of Zugdidi, just across the de-facto Abkhazia border. The Russian army also chased the Georgians out of their staging area in Gori and reached out to Senaki, targeting Georgian military assets there.

So in addition to restoring South Ossetia to the separatist status quo, there is obvious intent to decimate the Georgian military so as to preclude any near future Georgian aspirations to regain either separatist region by military force.

It is a nice two pronged operational strategy with multiple objectives, some of which have probably not been realized yet. Stay tuned for more. It will be critical to see if the current Georgian administration under President Saakashvili will survive the quick reversal in fortune.

The West is stumbling all over itself trying to come up with some sort of coercive plan to get Russia to stop its military push in Georgia, all the while seeming to not want to take a tough stand against a re-energized and confident Russia. But what if Western military aid were rushed into Georgia, turning the tables on Russia a bit, maybe causing them to have to ask themselves how far they want to take this–maybe a wider war with Georgia does really risk US and European military intervention?

I was surprised and intrigued to hear reports of Russian use of ballistic missiles against targets in Georgia. Given the array of weapon systems and technology at the disposal of Russian battlefield commanders, it seemed an odd choice of tool for the job at hand…unless, of course, the job at hand is something other than the destruction of assorted ground targets in Georgia. More on that later.

Details are still sketchy, but I’ve read at least two reports indicating that the missiles in question were of the SS-21 variety, pictured above. As you can see, they’re a mobile, short-range system, with a minimum range of 15 km and a maximum range of about 70 km. They weigh about 2000 kilograms (4,409 lbs) and carry a warhead of 482 kg (1,062 lbs). Depending on whether it’s an A or a B model, the SS-21 can be loaded with a number of warhead options, from HE, to chemical, to EMP, to anti-runway and anti-personnel submunitions, and, of course, nuclear devices in either the 10 or 100 kiloton variety. The A model is said to be accurate to within 150 meters or so, and the B model is supposed to be accurate to around 100 meters.

What makes the SS-21 and like systems such an odd choice of weapon for, say, blowing up parts of Gori, is that, unless you’re using the missile’s less conventional warhead options–nuclear, or chemical, for example, or EMP–it’s a pretty inefficient way to deliver a payload to a target. A single Su-25 Frogfoot attack aircraft, for example, carries over eight times the explosive weight of an SS-21. Moreover, the Su-25 can be diverted mid sortie to attack targets of opportunity, and, with a human pilot, can discriminate between and prioritize targets on the ground in a way that the SS-21 cannot. Additionally, while I have no idea what an SS-21 costs, I know they are not cheap–and much more expensive, per pound of explosive power delivered than an aircraft sortie.

So why use the SS-21? I’ve heard it suggested that, as Georgian air defenses had shot down several Russian aircraft (last count I saw had the Georgians claiming 10 and the Russians acknowledging 2), the use of ballistic missiles came about as a means of striking targets without exposing aircraft and pilots to Georgian air defenses. This explanation doesn’t ring true with me, however. In light of the level of resources the Russians have committed to the conflict, it seems unlikely that they’d give sacrifice as valuable tactical tool as their ground-attack air assets over 10 lost aircraft–assuming for the sake of argument that Georgian figures are correct. Furthermore, I’ve not seen any evidence to suggest that the Russians have discontinued their air attacks in favor of ballistic missile strikes–only that they’ve engaged in missile strikes as well.

It seems more likely to me that Russian use of ballistic missiles has very little to do with destroying targets in Georgia or not exposing air assets to the perils of combat. Rather, I submit that it has everything to do with sending a message. It seems likely to me that Russia, like Georgia, expected Western/NATO intervention and, with that in mind, wanted western leaders considering such intervention to have Russian ballistic missiles on their mind. Not only are ballistic missiles a cold-war boogeyman that such leaders would be familiar with, they also pose unique threats to western forces. Even if the U.S. missile shield were operational, it wouldn’t cover Georgia, and would deal with such short-range threats as the SS-21 with great difficulty. So for all intents and purposes, the SS-21 cannot be shot down–and can deliver a variety of warheads (even with the nuclear option of the table, which it certainly is) within 150 meters of the forces of western intervention–is it really worth it to the U.S. or a European state to intervene in Georgia if it means having a naval vessel, or group of same, utterly disabled by an EMP? Maybe, but that possibility makes the decision to intervene a weightier one.

I argue that Russian use of ballistic missiles is meant as a warning flag to potential interventionists–an attempt to call to mind a threat that, if not sufficient to deter intervention altogether, might at least delay it until Russian objectives on the ground can be met.

Am I wrong? What do you think?

I worry about command and control on the Georgian military side. I got a couple of emails from Georgian reservists and it seems like the Georgian armed forces are in a complete route. It is as if they never anticipated Russia’s strong response and thus had no contingency plan. They also don’t seem committed to dig in anywhere and defend until they can slow down the Russian military machine and make Russia consider a ceasefire, or wait for the West to come up with something. There certainly will not be any ceasefire while Russia can press its advantage.

It is difficult and unfair to draw parallels, but the Chechen separatists had a clear vision that their war with Russia was an all or nothing affair and their strategy evolved from there. I can’t say I blame the Georgians, but they don’t seem willing to fight in their capital for the sake of defending the point of territorial integrity in South Ossetia or Abkhazia. The fact is, they aren’t even holding Gori, nor the main east-west Hwy traversing the country, and by many accounts are not holding Zugdidi, Senaki and Poti–key western cities.

Yes, Russia is a super power with an almost inexhaustible supply of military arms and men, but Georgia is a terrain made for the kind of war that could exhaust even the largest of armies. To engage in that war of course would be so destructive that I can see why the Georgians do not pursue this strategy, but clearly there must be a plan to stop retreating and hold territory at all costs. If the Georgians don’t stop the Russian assault it will be solely up to the Russians to determine when and where its operations will end.

I feel uncomfortable even publishing this post because critiquing any military planning, or lack of military planning, rings a bit hollow in the reality of thousands of real men women and children on both sides of the conflict left dead and wounded, or at the very least homeless.